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Chapter 6 
 
France: Stacking the Deck 
 
Robert Elgie 
 
This chapter examines the two-ballot electoral system in France. The main focus 
is on the system used for elections to the lower house of the French parliament, 
the National Assembly. These elections are contested on the basis of a specific 
type of two-ballot system, namely a single-member, semi-closed, majority-
plurality system. At the same time, France has a rather unusual political system 
in which the President of the Republic is a major political actor. Therefore, this 
chapter also refers in passing to the system used for presidential elections. This is 
a variant of the above system. There are four parts to the chapter. The first part 
identifies the origins of the two electoral systems. The second part outlines the 
mechanics of the French two-ballot system. The third part discusses the political 
consequences of the system. The fourth part addresses the seemingly perennial 
issue of electoral reform. There is a brief conclusion. 
 
The origins of the current electoral systems 
 
In June 1958, the French political system collapsed. To save the regime from the 
imminent prospect of martial law, General Charles de Gaulle was called upon to 
form a government. He agreed on condition that there would be a new 
Constitution. In October 1958, after being approved in a referendum, the 
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic came into force. In December 1958 de 
Gaulle was elected as the first President of the Fifth Republic, winning a 
landslide victory in the electoral college. In January 1959 he appointed Michel 
Debré as Prime Minister. 
The origins of the electoral system for the National Assembly date back to 
the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. A two-ballot system was used for 
much of the period 1870-1940 during the Third Republic. However, during the 
Fourth Republic (1946-58) a proportional representation highest-average list-
based system was used. The collapse of the Fourth Republic undermined the 
credibility of virtually all the institutions associated with it. As a result, when de 
Gaulle returned to power in 1958 electoral reform was inevitable. At this time, 
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Michel Debré was the gaullists’ main spokesperson on institutional reform. He 
had long been in favour of a majority system. He believed that such systems 
were based on the conception of the state as an independent actor in its own 
right and one that could shape the party system. By contrast, he believed that 
proportional systems were based on a political philosophy that viewed the state 
as merely the sum total of the interests and groups that existed in society as a 
whole (Harmsen, 1988: 283). The former was entirely consistent with gaullist 
political philosophy. The latter was totally repugnant to it. As a result, even 
though Debré failed to gain support for the inclusion of either the details or the 
principles of the new electoral system in the Constitution (Wahl, 1959: 366-67), a 
shift to a majority system was inevitable. Indeed, the communists were the only 
major force that objected. That said, there was little support among either the 
public or the political class for a UK-style single-member plurality system. By 
contrast, there was more general support for the reintroduction of a two-ballot 
system. Here, though, a choice had to be made between a single-member 
constituency-based system and a department-based majority-list system. In the 
end, the General himself arbitrated in favour of the former (Duverger, 1960: 226). 
This decision meant that in the first election the gains made by the gaullists were 
likely to be considerably less than they would otherwise have been. However, it 
also meant that the General would not have the ‘problem’ of dealing with a very 
large right-wing majority in the National Assembly that would most likely have 
been in favour of Algeria remaining French (ibid.). The new system was passed 
by decree as a piece of emergency legislation on 13 October 1958 and the first 
elections were held a month later. 
 That said, the current system has only operated uninterruptedly since 
1988. The failure to constitutionalise the electoral system in 1958, or 
subsequently, has meant that electoral reform is almost permanently on the 
political agenda in France. (See below). Article 34 of the Constitution simply 
states that the system of election to the National Assembly is determined by law. 
Thus, the system can be reformed simply by the passage of a new law. From 
1958-81 inclusive, National Assembly elections were contested on the basis of the 
two-ballot system. However, in 1985 a department-based list system of 
proportional representation was introduced (Knapp, 1987). This was an 
extremely controversial reform (Favier and Martin-Roland, 1991: 306-15). It was 
one of François Mitterrand’s election promises at the 1981 presidential election. 
However, the reform was introduced, at Mitterrand’s behest, just prior to the 
 3 
1986 National Assembly, at which the left was predicted to lose very badly. In 
the end, the left still lost, but the size of the defeat was greatly reduced. What is 
more, the extreme-right National Front party won 35 seats, whereas most likely 
it would not have won any under the old system. Immediately following the 
1986 election, the right-wing majority reverted back to the two-ballot system. 
This reform was itself controversial because the right seemed to stand to gain the 
most from a return to the previous system. It was also controversial because the 
Minister of the Interior was accused of wanting to gerrymander the constituency 
boundaries to favour the right even more. In fact, the Constitutional Council 
limited the Minister’s right to redraw the constituency boundaries and as public 
opinion changed the socialists won the 1988 election. As we shall see later in the 
chapter, the issue of electoral reform has remained politically salient. All the 
same, since this time, there have been no further reforms to the system of election 
for the National Assembly. 
 The situation with regard to presidential elections is more 
straightforward. In 1958, the situation was not considered to be right for the 
direct election of the President. At least in part, this was because citizens in 
Algeria would have been able to vote. As a result, the President was indirectly 
elected by an electoral college, mainly comprising local notables. However, in 
September 1962, once the Algerian issue had been resolved, a decision was taken 
to amend the Constitution and to introduce the direct election of the President. 
At this time, there appears to have been little or no discussion about whether or 
not to adopt a two-ballot system for presidential elections. Instead, the main 
element of the discussion centred on the number of sponsors required to contest 
the election and the rules determining participation at the second ballot (Rudelle, 
1984: 705). Even then, these issues were resolved quite quickly. Moreover, since 
1962, with the exception of an increase in the required number of sponsors, the 
system has remained largely unaltered. In part, this is because the basic details of 
the system were constitutionalised at the time of the 1962 reform, including the 
rules for participation at the second ballot. Thus, a constitutional reform is 
needed to change the details of the system. More generally, the system has 
enjoyed widespread popular and political support. Indeed, the 1993 Vedel (1993) 
committee on constitutional reform made no mention of reforming the basic 
mechanics of the system of election for the President, even though it did address 
a wide range of other issues. 
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How the electoral systems work 
 
Elections to the National Assembly are contested on the basis of single-member 
constituencies. At the 2002 election, there were 577 constituencies, 555 of which 
were situated in metropolitan France and the remainder in France’s overseas 
departments and territories. In metropolitan France, the department (the 
equivalent of UK or US counties) is the basic territorial area within which 
constituency boundaries are drawn. The number of constituencies per 
department varies according to the population of the department, but there must 
be a minimum of two constituencies in a department. Moreover, in any one 
constituency the size of the electorate should not vary by more than 20 per cent 
from the average size of the electorate in all the constituencies in the department. 
In other words, there are rules to guarantee some equality of representation, but 
discrepancies still remain. So, at the 2002 election, 15 departments contained just 
two constituencies each. By contrast, one department, Nord, contained 24 
constituencies and the Paris department had 21. The number of inhabitants per 
constituency in metropolitan France ranged from a high of 188,200 in the second 
constituency of the Val d’Oise department in the Paris suburbs to a low of 34,374 
in the second constituency of the Lozère department which is in a highly rural 
and sparsely populated area. The 1986 electoral law specified that constituency 
boundaries should be redrawn after every other census, in practice meaning 
every 20 years or so. The boundaries are proposed by the government, 
specifically by Minister of the Interior, and submitted to the highest 
administrative courts in the land for their advice (Council of State, Court of 
Accounts, Court of Cassation). The changes are then voted by the National 
Assembly. 
 In each constituency, elections, which are always held on a Sunday, take 
place according to what can be called a two-ballot majority-plurality system 
(Elgie, 1997). In basic terms, a candidate is elected by virtue of winning either a 
majority of votes at the first ballot, or, failing that, a plurality of votes at the 
second ballot, hence majority-plurality. More specifically, voters cast one vote. 
The candidates names are printed on separate pieces of paper and voters vote by 
dropping the name of their preferred candidate into the ballot box. At the first 
round, a candidate is elected if s/he wins more than 50 per cent of the valid votes 
cast and the number of votes cast for that candidate amounts to more than 25 per 
cent of the registered electorate. The number of candidates elected at the first 
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ballot has ranged from a high of 166 at the 1968 election to a low of 12 in 1997 
(www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/historique-3.asp - accessed 10 April 
2003). In the constituencies where no candidate has been elected at the first 
ballot, there is a second ballot one week later. At the second ballot, only 
candidates who stood at the first ballot are allowed to stand again. Moreover, 
only those candidates who won the votes of more than 12.5 per cent of the 
registered electorate at the first ballot are allowed to proceed to the second. This 
is the sense in which the two-ballot system used for National Assembly elections 
is semi-closed. The contest at the second ballot is not simply a repeat of the first. 
In the event that only one candidate has crossed the required threshold, then the 
second-placed candidate may still proceed to the second ballot. In the case where 
no candidates have crossed the threshold, then the top two candidates may go 
through. In some cases, only one candidate contests the second ballot. This 
happens where there are only two eligible candidates and where one of them 
drops out immediately after the first round. This scenario does occur, but 
invariably it involves the situation where the candidates are from two allied 
parties. When it does occur, the second-placed candidate is usually the one who 
steps down. Whatever the situation, in the event that there are two candidates at 
the second ballot a simple plurality of votes is required to secure election. (For 
the results of the 2002 National Assembly election, see Table 6.1.) 
 Table 6.1 about here. 
 The mechanics of the presidential election system are similar to but 
slightly different from the system used for National Assembly elections. There is, 
of course, just one constituency. Again, elections are held on Sundays and, as 
before, voters have just one vote. In order to be elected at the first ballot, a 
candidate must win more than 50 per cent of the valid votes cast. If no candidate 
does so, and none has in the history of the Fifth Republic to date, then a second 
ballot is held two weeks later. The presidential system differs from the National 
Assembly system because it is a closed run-off system. In other words, at the 
second ballot only the top two candidates at the first ballot are allowed to stand. 
Whatever the terminology, if one of these candidates decides not to contest the 
second ballot, and this has never happened so far, the next best-placed candidate 
is allowed to stand. At the second ballot, the candidate who wins the plurality of 
votes (which will necessarily be more than 50 per cent of the valid votes cast) is 
elected. (For the results of the 2002 presidential election, see Table 6.2.) 
 Table 6.2 about here. 
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The political consequences of the electoral systems 
 
The party system 
 
In France, the two-ballot system has encouraged multi-party competition. The 
multi-party logic is associated with the first ballot of the election and is neatly 
captured by one writer: 
 
Given the first round does not count … every political group - and none 
more so the smallest and newest ones - can take advantage of the situation 
to ‘stand and be counted’, and, in so doing, they may be able to influence 
the largest groups (Parodi, 1978: 193). 
 
In short, smaller parties may feel that they have nothing to lose by contesting the 
first ballot. On the contrary, they may stand to gain by doing so, because if they 
can register a sufficiently large degree of support, then they can ensure that they 
are indispensable to the second-round process of alliance building. (See below). 
 The multi-party nature of the Fifth Republic’s party system is very clearly 
demonstrated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. In elections from 1959-97 inclusive, the 
effective number of legislative parties ranged from a low of 3.3 in 1981 to a high 
of 5.4 in 1959 with the next highest being 5.3 in 1973 (Thiébault, 2000: 499). It is 
important to note that in recent years multi-party competition has been 
encouraged by the relatively generous form of state funding for political parties 
that was introduced in 1990, whereby public monies are made available to all 
groups that stand 50 or more candidates at a given National Assembly election. 
All the same, well before this date, multi-party competition was an established 
aspect of the Fifth Republic’s political system. This is true even for the 1978 
parliamentary election, which is often cited as the one where party competition 
was at its most simple. Here, 14 groups won more than 0.5 per cent of the vote at 
the first ballot and five won more than 5 per cent. (See figures in Frears and 
Parodi, 1979: 64. These figures assume that the Christian Democrats and 
Republicans were separate groups). 
One factor that has affected the multi-party nature of the French two-
ballot system is the threshold that candidates need to pass in order to be eligible 
to contest the second ballot. In 1958, the threshold was five per cent. It was then 
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increased to 10 per cent in 1966 and was further raised to the current level of 12.5 
per cent in 1976. The raising of the threshold has penalised small parties and 
encouraged calls for a ‘vote utile’ (see below). As Bartolini notes, it meant “the 
automatic exclusion from the second ballot of most non-left or non-majority 
candidates, and reduced to almost nil the blackmail potential of the minor 
formations” (Bartolini, 1984: 107 - his emphasis). A similar point applies to 
presidential elections, but in a slightly different way. In 1976, the required 
number of sponsors was increased in an attempt to reduce the number of 
candidates standing at the first ballot. This change had an immediate effect. 
There were six first-round presidential candidates in 1965, seven in 1969 and 12 
in 1974. However, in 1981, there were only 10 candidates, while in 1988 and 1995 
there were nine candidates on each occasion. Overall, these figures confirm that 
the two-ballot system encourages multi-party politics. For example, despite the 
reforms, there are still a large number of first-round presidential candidates. 
Indeed, in 2002 there were no fewer than sixteen. Even so, the multi-party effects 
of the two-ballot system can still be tempered somewhat by the introduction of 
seemingly innocuous institutional amendments that alter the rules of the game at 
either the first-ballot and/or the second-ballot. 
 In addition to the basic multi-party logic of the French two-ballot system, 
there is a separate and somewhat counter-balancing alliance-building logic. This 
logic is associated with the second round of the contest. At the second ballot the 
remaining candidates usually need to increase their first-round vote in order to 
win. Therefore, they have an incentive to build alliances. The alliance-building 
imperative of the two-ballot system has been clearly demonstrated since 1958. 
For example, one of the paradoxes of the early years of the Fifth Republic was 
that the Communist party became a more important political actor than it had 
been under the Fourth Republic, despite the fact that it would most likely have 
won more parliamentary seats had the electoral system not been changed. This is 
because during the Fourth Republic the non-communist left had little incentive 
to ally with the communists, because it was always likely to be able to form a 
government with the centre and/or centre-right. In the Fifth Republic, this logic 
did not apply. The centre-right, in the form of the gaullists, emerged as the 
dominant political party and was able to form a government with the support of 
non-gaullist centre-right groups such as Giscard d’Estaing’s Independent 
Republicans. In this context and in isolation from each other, the two basic 
elements of the left, communist and non-communist, were condemned to 
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opposition. Gradually, though, the left accepted the logic of the system 
(Duhamel, 1980). In order to stand any chance of winning, they needed to co-
operate. As a result, by the early 1970s the communists and the socialists had 
formed an electoral alliance, the union of the left. The union of the left was based 
on a common programme for government. More importantly, for the purposes 
of this chapter at least, it led to a reciprocal electoral agreement. In general terms, 
the two parties agreed not to compete against each other at the second ballot. In 
other words, if both a socialist and a communist found themselves in a position 
to contest the second ballot against the right, the candidate from the party which 
was less well placed would voluntarily stand down. This arrangement 
maximised the opportunity for the left-wing candidate to be elected. Indeed, it 
was taken one step further in 1974 when François Mitterrand stood as the 
candidate of the united left at the first ballot of the presidential election. He was 
unsuccessful, but only just and the benefits of an electoral agreement were clear. 
In fact, the programmatic agreement between the two parties collapsed in 1976. 
However, the electoral arrangement survived and has remained more or less 
intact ever since. 
 The alliance-building imperative of the two-ballot system has had a 
further aspect during the Fifth Republic. It has encouraged binary competition, 
meaning competition between just two alliances. In short, the two-ballot system 
punishes stand-alone parties or groups, particularly small ones. It does so as a 
result of a simple mechanical effect. Unless stand-alone and small parties have a 
strong geographical concentration, such as the regionalist parties in France’s 
overseas departments and territories, they will find that they are unable to win 
through to the second ballot, or that, if they do so, they are likely to be defeated 
there by candidates and parties who have been able to build wide-ranging 
alliances. As a result, stand-alone parties and small parties are encouraged to join 
such alliances, unless they see a strategic reason for not doing so. More than that, 
the two-ballot system gives a certain encouragement to voters not to waste their 
vote. In this regard, it is common to hear senior politicians from large parties 
talking about ‘le vote utile’ - literally ‘a useful vote’. Indeed, this call is often made 
prior to the first ballot and not just at the second in the cases where more than 
two candidates are standing. The net effect is that the inherent multi-party logic 
of the two-ballot system is counter-balanced by the binary alliance-building logic 
that is also present. Whatever the interaction between these two strategic 
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incentives, there has been little room for a successful independent force under 
the Fifth Republic. 
This point can be illustrated very clearly in the case of the centre. In the 
1960s, the Christian Democrats tried to steer a third way between the right and 
the left. In the end, though, they chose to join the right-wing majority because by 
remaining outside they risked losing their remaining parliamentary seats and all 
chance of entering government (Elgie, 1994). This point can also be illustrated 
very clearly, but in a totally different way, in the case of the National Front. Since 
the 1980s the extreme right has refused to contemplate any alliance with the 
mainsteam right. (Indeed, it must be said that, for the most part, the mainstream 
right has also refused to contemplate any alliance with it.) As a result, though, 
while the extreme-right’s first-ballot performance has often been very 
impressive, or alarming, the failure to be part of an electoral alliance has meant 
that its parliamentary representation has been virtually non-existent. Unlike the 
situation with the centrists in the 1960s, this situation has suited the National 
Front’s strategy. The party believes that all the major forces are corrupt, 
including the mainstream right. More than that, elements of the National Front’s 
electorate, and most notably its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, still harbour 
resentment against the gaullists because of the General’s decision to negotiate 
Algeria’s independence. Thus, any alliance with the mainstream right, including 
the gaullists, is impossible to contemplate. In this regard, though, as in so many 
others, the National Front is a case apart. Most parties that have aspired to be 
independent have sooner or later succumbed to the binary logic of the two-ballot 
system. 
 A further consequence of the two-ballot system is that not only has it 
encouraged binary competition, it has also encouraged binary competition 
between the left and right. As Bartolini has put it: “the party must select its 
political and electoral alliances ... in a way which is congruent with the second-
party preference of the bulk of its electorate” (Bartolini, 1984: 117). In the Third 
Republic there were indeed two cross-cutting cleavages: the left/right cleavage 
and the confessional/secular cleavage. In this context, the two-ballot system led 
to complex sets of often locally-centred alliances (Elgie, 1997: 92-93). However, 
by 1958 the confessional/secular cleavage had disappeared. The net result is that 
from the very early years of the Fifth Republic the alliance-building process 
encouraged right-wing parties to work together and left-wing parties to do the 
same. 
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The logic of the left-right alliance-building process can be seen in the 
examples of both the union of the left and the disappearance of the centrists as an 
independent force, both of which were discussed above. A more recent example 
concerns the Greens. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Greens, under the 
leadership of Antoine Waechter, shunned any alliance with the left, refusing to 
accept any programmatic agreement or even a reciprocal electoral arrangement. 
As far as Waechter was concerned, the Greens were on neither the left nor the 
right. The result, though, was that the party stood no chance of winning any 
seats in the National Assembly, or influencing government policy. In the mid-
1990s the situation changed when the party elected a new leader, Dominique 
Voynet. In the run-up to the 1997 parliamentary election, the Greens struck a 
deal with the socialists which led to a reciprocal electoral arrangement. At the 
1997 National Assembly election the Greens won seven seats, their first ever, and 
Voynet was appointed as Minister for the Environment in the socialist-led 
government.   
 The final consequence of the electoral system on the party system is that it 
has encouraged centripetal left-right competition. As the old French political 
adage has it, at the first ballot voters select, whereas at the second they elect. To 
put it another way, at the first ballot voters choose, while at the second they 
eliminate. What both aphorisms capture is the notion that voters are motivated 
by different factors at the two ballots. At the first, they vote according to their 
basic party preference. At the second, their favoured party may be absent, so 
they may have to vote for the second-preference party. The net effect is that the 
two-ballot system has tended to reduce the support for extremes (Sartori, 1997: 
65). There is no a priori reason why a large number of voters cannot have an 
extreme party as their second preference, but in France since 1958 there has 
tended to be a relatively normal distribution of preferences along the left/right 
axis. Thus, both left and right-wing alliances have tended to move towards the 
centre in order to maximise their electorate. 
 The evidence for this point is neatly demonstrated by the contrasting 
experiences of the communists and the extreme-right. By the early 1970s, the 
communists embraced the alliance-building logic of the system and were willing 
to form a pact with the socialists (see above). However, as early as 1974, François 
Mitterrand, the candidate of the united left at the presidential election, had 
already begun the process of distancing himself from the programmatic element 
of the union of the left in order to win over centrist voters. Seven years later, he 
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adopted the same strategy and on this occasion he succeeded. In other words, 
Mitterrand, the de jure or de facto leader of the left-wing alliance soon came to 
realise that elections were won at the centre rather than the extremes. 
Paradoxically, the recent success of the National Front reinforces this point. Since 
1974 the National Front has regularly won between 10-15 per cent at presidential 
and legislative elections. More than that, the great surprise of the 2002 
presidential election was that the leader of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
beat the main left-wing candidate, Lionel Jospin, into second place and, thus, 
went through to the second ballot. All the same, despite its support, the National 
Front has not been successful under the two ballot system. The party has 
returned scarcely any deputies and at the second round of the 2002 presidential 
election Le Pen hardly improved his first-round score. In this context, the key 
point is not that extreme parties have consistently won a large number of votes 
under the two-ballot system. After all, the electoral system is only one 
determinant of the reason why people vote the way they do. Instead, the point is 
that under such a system extreme parties have to choose either to remain 
marginalised and risk winning no seats or join an alliance that will fight elections 
at the centre and risk compromising their principles. In both cases, the threat 
they pose to the system is diminished. This is one of the main reasons why 
Sartori supports two-ballot systems generally. As he puts it, the two-ballot 
system “eminently facilitates governability under adverse conditions” (Sartori, 
1997: 69). The Fifth Republic is a good case in point. 
 
The parties 
 
In France, political parties have four main characteristics (Elgie and Griggs, 2000: 
99-102). Many have long-standing historical antecedents, but most have been 
formed relatively recently; they tend to have low membership levels and 
powerful local notables; they are highly personalised leader-centred institutions; 
and they are highly factionalised. In addition, French parliamentary parties 
exhibit two further features. Individually, they are highly disciplined; but there 
can be high levels of within-block competition. These characteristics are best 
explained by the wider institutional structures of the Fifth Republic and by the 
dominance of the left-right cleavage, rather than by the two-ballot system per se. 
In particular, the personality-centred aspect of political parties and the 
factionalised nature of party organisation are direct consequences of the 
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presidentialised nature of the Fifth Republic. That said, the two-ballot electoral 
system does relate in various ways to the other basic characteristics of French 
parties and their parliamentary counterparts. 
 The ideological and organisational origins of most French political parties 
date back to the 19th century or before. The classic account of right-wing parties 
in this regard is by Rémond (1982). That said, most parties have been formed 
very recently: for example, the UMP in 2002; the Greens in 1984; the centre-right 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) in 1978; the FN in 1972; and the Socialist 
party (PS) in 1969. The main reason for the seemingly continual decline and 
rebirth of French political parties during the Fifth Republic is the 
presidentialisation of the political system. The presidential contest is highly 
personalised. All the same, serious presidential candidates need the backing of 
some form of organisational structure. Thus, parties have been created as 
vehicles for either a movement’s or an individual’s presidential ambitions. For 
example, the PS was formed in the aftermath of the disastrous left-wing showing 
at the 1968 presidential election and the UMP was set up around the time of the 
2002 presidential election. That said, the two-ballot process is not completely 
divorced from this phenomenon because it provides at least some inherent 
incentive for parties to split. A newly-formed party knows that even the threat 
that it may do fairly well at the first ballot means that it will have to be included 
in the general alliance-building process. Thus, two-ballot system makes the cost 
of party fragmentation relatively low. 
 The organisational weakness of French political parties and the presence 
of powerful local notables are well-established features of French political life. 
These features predate the introduction of the two-ballot system in the Third 
Republic, never mind its reintroduction in 1958. Thus, the electoral system 
cannot be seen as a cause of these enduring political practices. All the same, this 
feature of French political parties does have an effect on the operation of the two-
ballot system. During the Fifth Republic, the alliance-building logic of the 
electoral system has been elite-centred, meaning that alliances have been 
negotiated by party hierarchies in Paris and imposed on the party organisations 
in local electoral constituencies. In this context, the power of local notables has 
sometimes made the alliance-building process more complex. For example, there 
may be competition between two mayors for the same parliamentary seat. If they 
are from different parties, then one may be reluctant to stand down and risk 
letting the other consolidate his/her influence within the local area. In this 
 13 
context, dissident candidates (often classed as divers gauche, or divers droite) are 
not unheard of. It is apparent, therefore, that the presence of local notables can 
make the elite nature of the alliance-building process more difficult. 
 In the main, French parliamentary parties are quite well disciplined. 
Governments rarely lose votes as a function of dissent within the ranks of their 
own supporters. That said, on occasions there has been a considerable amount of 
within-block competition in parliament. The two-ballot system accounts for at 
least part of they reason why such competition occurs. In short, on occasions the 
multi-party logic of the system has prevailed over the alliance-building logic. For 
example, in the period 1976-81, there was fierce competition between the 
gaullists and the President Giscard d’Estaing’s party, the UDF. Even though both 
parties were represented in government, the rivalry between Giscard and the 
gaullist party leader, Jacques Chirac, was intense. On this occasion, the within-
block competition was so fierce because the support for both parties was 
approximately the same and both leaders intended to stand at the 1981 
presidential election. So, while the multi-party logic of the two-ballot system 
means that both right and left-wing alliances are often fractious, on this occasion 
the level of within-block competition was even greater than usual because the 
stakes were so high. Indeed, a similar situation occurred in the period 1997-2002. 
On this occasion, the PS was the dominant party in the government and the 
socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, was assured of being the leading left-wing 
candidate at the 2002 presidential election. Even so, the relationship between the 
various parties in the government was sometimes fraught. On the assumption 
that the government would be returned after the 2002 electoral cycle, it was vital 
for each of the smaller parties to maximise their post-electoral bargaining power. 
Given that the presidential election came before the legislative election, this 
meant that each of the governing parties had an incentive to stand a candidate at 
the first round. Moreover, in the run up to the election the parties needed to 
differentiate themselves from each other in the hope of maximising their core 
electorate and winning over as many uncommitted voters and voters from 
within the general left-wing block. The result is well known. The plethora of left-
wing candidates harmed Jospin’s first-round campaign and he was beaten into 
second place by Jean-Marie Le Pen. The two-ballot system did not cause this 
situation, but it did provide a strategic context within which it occurred. 
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Parliament 
 
The direct effect of the two-ballot system on the background of French deputies 
has been minimal, or at least there is little to distinguish the effect of this system 
from the effect of similar majoritarian systems. In this regard, the two most 
noticeable elements of the French system of representation at the National 
Assembly level are the interpenetration of local and national officeholders and 
the low level of female representation. The electoral system has little effect on the 
former but some effect on the latter. 
In the 1997-2002 legislature, 97 per cent of all deputies simultaneously 
held some sort of elected office at the local level. The entrenched system of local 
notables has already been mentioned and this figure is merely another 
manifestation of it. In France, there has long been the expectation that powerful 
figures at the local level need to win representation in the National Assembly in 
order to maximise their influence over the political process generally. At the 
same time, there has been an equivalent expectation that people who are elected 
to the National Assembly without first having a local base need to be 
‘parachuted’ into a position of responsibility at the local level as soon as possible. 
The two-ballot electoral system plays no part in creating these expectations. In 
this way, it is certainly true that French deputies pay perhaps more attention to 
constituency affairs, or more accurately to the affairs of that part of their local 
constituency in which they hold elected office, than their counterparts elsewhere. 
However, this situation is not so much a function of the electoral system as the 
result of more long-standing systemic features. 
The area where the electoral system has had some effect is in the under-
representation of women. As with most majoritarian electoral systems, the two-
ballot system tends to encourage most parties to select white, middle-class, male 
candidates. As a result, in France the level of female representation has been 
relatively low. During the course of the 1997-2002 legislature, the left-wing 
government introduced the so-called ‘parity’ reform that was designed to 
increase the representation of women by encouraging parties to increase the 
number of women selected to contest winnable seats. However, at the 2002 
National Assembly level it had little effect. At the outset of the 1997 legislature, 
11 per cent of all deputies were women. Immediately following the 2002 election, 
this figure had risen to only 12 per cent (source: www.assemblee.nationale.fr 
/12/tribun/gs2.asp#P-1_0 - accessed 2 October 2003). This figure contrasts with 
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the relatively high level of female representation in the European parliament, 
elections to which are held under a system of proportional representations and 
where in the 1999-2004 legislature 43 per cent of France’s MEPs were female. 
That said, the blame for the consistently low level of female representation in the 
National Assembly does not lie solely with the electoral system. As in other 
countries, a series of social norms and institutionalised practices means that the 
level of female representation is lower than it should be. Even so, the two-ballot 
system can be counted as one of the factors that has kept the level of female 
representation in the National Assembly so low for such a long time. 
 
The government 
 
In stark contrast to the Fourth Republic, one of the so-called ‘divine surprises’ of 
the Fifth Republic was the emergence of ‘le fait majoritaire’, or majoritarianism. 
For most of the Fifth Republic either the left- or right-wing alliance has enjoyed 
majority support in the National Assembly. The reason for this situation is 
complex and is linked to deep-rooted social and ideological change. All the same, 
the two-ballot system has played a not inconsiderable part in this process. The 
system has produced highly disproportional electoral results, over-representing 
larger parties, or electoral groupings, and under-representing smaller ones. This 
has helped to create majority governments. That said, for the most part the 
system has returned coalition governments. This is a direct effect of the alliance-
building logic that was discussed in the previous sub-section. 
In France, the first-round result is taken as the standard indicator of party 
support. This is because not all seats are contested at the second round and not 
all candidates are allowed to stand even when there is a contest. In this context, 
the two-ballot system in France has produced a relatively high deviation from 
proportionality at virtually all National Assembly elections since 1958. (See Table 
6.3). In recent times, the main victim of the system has been the extreme-right 
National Front. At the last four elections (1988, 1993, 1997 and 2002), the party 
has won 9.93, 12.87, 15.35 and 11.34 per cent of the total votes cast respectively. 
However, it has returned only one deputy throughout this period. This is not a 
coincidence. In 1986, the newly-elected right-wing government justified a swift 
return to the two-ballot system at least partly on the basis that the PR system had 
resulted in the election of a considerable number of National Front deputies and 
that this was a blow to the democratic foundations of the parliamentary system. 
 16 
Whatever the particularities of this situation, the fact remains that the two-ballot 
system has always tended to produce highly disproportional results at National 
Assembly elections and majority governments. Indeed, since 1962, there has been 
only one minority government (1988-93). In short, there is a strong majoritarian 
logic to the two-ballot system. 
 Table 6.3 about here. 
 At the same time, though, the two-ballot system has tended to produce 
majority coalition governments. There was a single-party majority in the 
National Assembly for 10 years in the period 1958-2002 - the gaullists from 1968-
73 and the socialists from 1981-86. (It should be noted that the right-wing Union 
for a Popular Majority (UMP) party has enjoyed this eponymous status since the 
2002 legislative election). Even so, there was only one single-party majority 
government in the same period (1958-2002) and then for only two years - the 
socialist government from 1984-86. (There was also a single-party minority 
socialist government from 1988-93 and, again, it should be noted that the UMP 
has governed alone since 2002). In 1968, the gaullists won an outright 
parliamentary majority, but they did so at least partly as a result of the support 
they gained from their centre-right colleagues at the second ballot. Thus, they 
agreed to form a coalition government, albeit an imbalanced one in their own 
favour. The same situation occurred in 1981, when the socialists won with 
support from the communists. (This coalition collapsed in 1984, leaving the 
socialists in office on their own). In other words, the two-ballot system has 
established coalition governments as the norm, even when arithmetically they 
have not been necessary. What is more, for the most part these coalitions have, in 
effect, been agreed prior to the election. On occasions, voters have been 
presented with the equivalent of coalition manifestos prior to the first ballot 
(Thiébault, 2000: 508-12). More often than not, though, parties have fought the 
election merely on the basis of a reciprocal electoral arrangement (see above), or 
process of désistement. Whatever the situation, following the election, 
governments have usually been formed in a matter of days rather than weeks 
with discussions focussing on the details of portfolio allocation (ibid.: 504). 
 
 
 
 
The politics of electoral reform 
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In France, as elsewhere, the electoral system helps to shape the process of 
political competition. At the same time, the choice of electoral system is itself the 
product of a process of political competition and nowhere is this point illustrated 
more clearly than in France. In the period since the beginning of modern-day 
French politics in 1871, the electoral system has been changed on 11 occasions. 
Moreover, this figure only includes major changes to the system of election to the 
National Assembly. Even here, it excludes less substantive but not necessarily 
insignificant reforms, such as the changes to the second-ballot eligibility 
threshold in 1966 and 1976 (see above). All in all, since 1871 there has been a new 
electoral system after every three elections on average! 
 In this context, it will hardly come as a surprise to learn that governing 
parties have introduced reforms to suit their own interests. The switch to PR in 
1985 is the most recent and one of the most blatant cases in point. Even then, the 
absence of any reform since the return to the two-ballot system in 1986 should 
not be taken as a sign that political actors have become more disinterested in this 
regard. For example, in autumn 1991 the socialist government prepared a new 
electoral bill that would have introduced a mixed system. Once again, the fact 
that the socialists’ popularity had slumped was at least part of the motivation for 
addressing the issue at this time. The reform would have limited the party’s 
losses at the upcoming contest. In the end, the absence of a parliamentary 
majority and divisions within the party itself meant that the reform was 
dropped. In addition, the right-wing majority is currently considering another 
reform. This time there is some discussion as to whether a maximum of only two 
candidates should be allowed to contest the second ballot 
(http://www.tf1/news/france/0,,935103,00.html - accessed 6 May 2003). On the 
face of it, this a relatively innocent proposal. However, it has a very political 
motivation. In 1997, there were 76 so-called ‘triangular’ second-round contests, 
or ones where there was a candidate from each of the left, the right and the 
extreme right. On this occasion, the left won 46 of these contests and right won 
30. The right, though, would have gained had only two candidates been allowed 
to stand. In this case, the left would probably have won just 21 of these seats and 
the right would have won the rest (Dolez, 2002, p. 585). Thus, the suggestion that 
the second-round competition should be limited to only two candidates is merely 
another potential example of the way in which governments of the day have 
tried to stack the deck in their own favour. In this case, the electoral prospects of 
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the mainstream right would most likely be enhanced because the anti-left vote 
would no longer be split. 
 Overall, the evidence suggests that the issue of electoral reform will 
remain politically salient. This is partly because such changes have become 
almost routine in French political life. There is always an outcry when 
governments propose any such reform, but the electorate never seems to punish 
the government when a reform is introduced. The government’s popularity is 
much more closely linked to economic issues than institutional engineering. It is 
also partly because there are few obstacles to electoral reform. There is no 
constitutional limitation and only a parliamentary majority is required. That said, 
in the foreseeable future at least, the issue of substantive electoral reform is more 
likely to exercise the minds of the left than the right. This is because the right is 
now dominated by one large party. This party stands to gain from the two-ballot 
system, so there is little incentive for it to support any major change. By contrast, 
the left is divided. The Socialist party is poorly placed to win an outright 
majority by itself. Thus, it needs partners. This is ineluctable logic of the Fifth 
Republic. In particular, it needs the support of the Greens and the Communist 
party, even if the latter is a wasting asset. These parties, most notably the Greens, 
would benefit from the introduction of even a dose of proportionality. Thus, a 
commitment to electoral reform may be part of any left-wing alliance in the 
coming years. More than that, given there is now what amounts to a single large 
party on the right, the socialists have more of an incentive to agree to such a 
demand than before because it may serve as a way of reducing the long-term 
prospects of right-wing dominance. Once again, though, the issue of electoral 
reform needs to be placed in a wider context. The socialists may prefer to 
propose a more general reform of the Fifth Republic’s political system. Indeed, 
the idea of a Sixth Republic has more support on the left now than at any point 
for 30 years or more. In this scenario, a reform of the system of election to the 
National Assembly may not necessarily be part of the package. Alternatively, the 
socialists may propose electoral reform, but only for second-order elections. 
There is plenty of room to reform the system of election to the Senate in a way 
that would benefit potential allies. What is more, the right has only just changed 
the system of election to regional councils, decreasing the level of 
proportionality. This creates a new bargaining space on the left in this regard. 
Whatever the scenario, when it comes to electoral reform in France, the bottom 
line is ‘watch this space’. 
 19 
 
Conclusion 
 
The two-ballot majority-plurality system has helped to shape the political system 
of the Fifth Republic as we know it today. The regime’s predecessor, the Fourth 
Republic, was beset by weak coalition governments that changed on average 
every six months. The situation under the Fifth Republic has been very different. 
The tendency towards coalition government has been maintained. More 
importantly, though, the Fifth Republic has seen the emergence and 
institutionalisation of the so-called ‘fait majoritaire’, or majoritarianism. The two-
ballot electoral system has been instrumental in this development. True, the 
multi-party logic of the first ballot has meant that the composition of the majority 
has sometimes been quite heterogeneous. For example, certain right-wing 
governments have been conglomerations of ideologically consistent, but 
organisationally competitive groups. Even so, in the French context the very 
existence of stable majority governments is a significant development and, 
furthermore, one that the gaullist architects of the 1958 Constitution were 
determined to achieve. It must be remembered, though, that the introduction of 
the two-ballot majority-plurality electoral system in 1958 was only one of a series 
of intitutional reforms. Moreover, the introduction of the new electoral system at 
that time took place in the context of fundamental social change. At that time, 
these changes reinforced the effects of the two-ballot system and accelerated the 
tendency towards majoritarianism. Overall, since 1958 the French experience has 
confirmed the basic insight that the two-ballot system belongs to the family of 
majority systems. All the same, it has also suggested that the impact of the 
system is sensitive to wider institutional and social factors and perhaps more so 
than other electoral systems. 
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Table 6.1 Votes at the first round of the 2002 French National Assembly 
election and seats following second-round results 
 
Party/political affiliation    Votes      First-round       Seats after          Seats 
        vote (%)    the second round 
Union pour la Majorité  8,408,023 33.3  355  61.5 
Présidentielle (Union for the 
Presidential Majority - since 
renamed Union for a Popular 
Majority - centre-right) 
Parti socialiste    6,086,599 24.1  140  24.3 
(Socialist party) 
Front National (National  2,862,960 11.3     0    0.0  
Front - extreme right) 
Union pour la Démocratie française 1,226,462   4.9    29    5.0 
(Union for French Democracy - 
centre right) 
Parti communiste   1,216,178   4.8    21    3.6 
(Communist party) 
Verts (Greens)    1,138,222   4.5     3    0.5 
Divers droite (right)      921,973   3.7     9    1.6 
Chasse Pêche Nature Traditions    422,448   1.7     0    0.0 
(Hunting Fishing Nature Traditions) 
Parti Radical de gauche      388,891   1.5     7    1.2 
(Left-Radical party) 
Ligue Communiste révolutionnaire    320,467   1.3     0    0.0 
(Revolutionary Communist League, 
extreme left) 
Lutte Ouvrière      301,984   1.2     0    0.0 
(Workers’ Struggle - extreme left) 
Pôle Républicain (Republican Pole)    299,897   1.2     0    0.0 
Other ecologists      295,899   1.2     0    0.0 
Mouvement National Républicain    276,376   1.1     0    0.0 
(National Republican Movement - 
extreme right) 
Divers gauche (general left)     275,553   1.1     6    1.0 
Mouvement pour la France     202,831   0.9     1    0.2 
(Movement for France - right) 
Divers (Other)       194,946   0.8     0    0.0 
Démocratie Libérale (Liberal     104,767   0.4     2    0.4 
Democracy - centre right) 
Rassemblement pour la France      94,222   0.4     2    0.4  
(Rally for France - right) 
Extreme left         81,588   0.3     0    0.0 
Regionalists         66,240   0.3     1    0.2 
Extreme right         59,549   0.2     0    0.0 
Source (adapted): www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats.asp - accessed 28 April 2003 
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Table 6.2 The results of the 2002 French presidential election 
 
 Candidate       Votes       First round  Second round       
(party/political affiliation)                  (%)          (%) 
Jacques Chirac    5,665,855 19.9         82.2  
(Union for the Presidential Majority) 
Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front)  4,804,713 16.9         17.8   
Lionel Jospin (Socialist party)  4,610,113 16.2 
François Bayrou    1,949,170   6.8 
(Union for French Democracy) 
Arlette Laguiller (Workers’ Struggle) 1,630,045   5.7 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement (Republican Pole) 1,518,528   5.3 
Noël Mamère (Greens)   1,495,724   5.3 
Olivier Besancenot    1,210,562   4.3 
(Revolutionary Communist League) 
Jean Saint-Josse    1,204,689   4.2 
(Hunting Fishing Nature Traditions) 
Alain Madelin (Liberal Democracy)  1,113,484   3.9 
Robert Hue (Communist)      960,480   3.4 
Bruno Mégret        667,026   2.3 
(National Republican Movement) 
Christiane Taubira (Left-radicals)     660,447   2.3 
Corinne Lepage (right-wing ecologist)    535,837   1.9 
Christine Boutin (pro-life)      339,112   1.2 
Daniel Gluckstein (extreme-left)     132,686   0.5 
 
Source (adapted): www.elysee.fr/pres/elecpr1_.htm - accessed 29 April 2003 
 
Table 6.3 Deviations from proportionality in National Assembly elections, 
1958-1997 (Least Squares index) 
 
          Election    LS 
1958   21.2 
1962   15.0 
1967   10.0 
1968   19.2 
1973   11.0 
1978     6.6 
1981   16.0 
(1986 PR)    7.2 
1988   11.8 
1993   25.0 
1997 17.8 
2002 21.9 
 
Source: Communications from Arend Lijphart and Michael Gallagher 
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